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BEYOND REVOLUTION: ENDING 
LAWLESSNESS AND IMPUNITY DURING 
REVOLUTIONARY PERIODS 
Vanessa A. Arslanian* 
Abstract: In early 2011, mass protests erupted throughout Libya, political 
elites defected to form the resistance National Transitional Council, and 
the international community eventually intervened in the conflict. The 
result was the ouster of long-ruling leader Muammar Gaddafi and the be-
ginning of considerable political change in Libya. Following the Gaddafi 
regime’s overthrow, the regional militias that displaced Gaddafi refused to 
surrender arms to the interim government and continued to perpetrate 
illegal detentions, displacements, rapes, and summary executions. This 
Note assumes that events in Libya constitute an ongoing revolution, and 
places the violent episodes associated with it in a historical tradition of vi-
olence inherent in revolutionary periods. While revolutionary violence 
may be politically justifiable ex post, it is no longer legally justifiable given 
the network of international and regional law. Given this, interim Libyan 
leaders and their successors should ensure that both revolutionaries and 
former Gaddafi supporters are held accountable for their crimes. A hy-
brid approach, starting with a truth commission with eventual limited 
prosecutions, is the best way to bring a stable peace to Libya. 
Introduction 
 On October 20, 2011, Colonel Muammar el-Gaddafi,1 Libya’s self-
designated “leader of the revolution,” became the victim of a different 
revolution: the Libyan revolutionaries that ousted him from power also 
 
* Vanessa A. Arslanian is a Managing Editor for the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. She would like to thank Prof. Paulo Barrozo, Paul Caligiuri, Samantha 
Miko, and Rebecca Maret for their insight and assistance. She would also like to thank her 
parents, Dr. and Mrs. Vasken Arslanian, for their limitless support. 
1 Zoe Fox, How Do You Spell ‘Gaddafi’? The Linguistics Behind Libya’s Leader, Time (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/02/23/how-do-you-spell-gaddafi-the-linguistics-behind-libyas- 
leader/. Due to discrepancies in translation, Muammar el-Gaddafi’s name is notoriously diffi-
cult to spell; approximately 112 different spellings exist. Id. This Note adopts the spelling 
“Gaddafi,” as used in prior issues of the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. 
See, e.g., Sarah Joseph, Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights, 35 B.C. Int’l & Comp. 
L. Rev. 145, 145 (2012). 
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ended his life.2 Many Libyans rejoiced at the prospect of a new begin-
ning after Gaddafi’s oppressive forty-two-year reign.3 Western leaders, 
including U.S. President Barack Obama, also welcomed his downfall.4 
Some, however, voiced concern.5 Official reports from the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) initially stated that Gaddafi had been killed 
in cross-fire, an assertion belied by the videos and photographs that 
would surface in the hours following his death.6 Videos depicting Gad-
dafi at the time of his capture by militants, bleeding and apparently 
beaten, later showed him dead with a close-range bullet wound.7 The 
NTC now faces crucial choices about how to come to terms not only 
with the Gaddafi regime’s crimes, but also subsequent acts attributable 
to anti-Gaddafi revolutionaries.8 
 Part I of this Note provides a background on the conditions in 
Libya during the conflict. Part I also tracks events leading up to the 
present, outlining Libya’s continued revolution, in which it experiences 
spasms of violence similar to other modern revolutions. Part II exam-
ines relevant international and regional law in the context of the Lib-
yan revolution. Part III argues that while ex post political justifications 
for anomic revolutionary behavior—the idea “that all must be permit-
ted to those who act in the revolutionary direction”9—may still exist, a 
legal justification does not, given established regional and international 
law. Part III concludes that Libya and the international community 
                                                                                                                      
2 Neil MacFarquhar, Muammar el-Qaddafi, 69, an Erratic, Brutal and Defiant Leader, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 21, 2001, at A16; Liesl Gerntholtz, The Women’s Lib Movement in Libya Sees a Sur-
prising Twist, Hum. Rts. Watch (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/24/ 
womens-lib-movement-libya-sees-surprising-twist (referring to the events in Libya as a “revolu-
tion”); Libya: Investigate Deaths of Gaddafi and Son, Hum. Rts. Watch (Oct. 22, 2011), http:// 
www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/22/libya-investigate-deaths-gaddafi-and-son. 
3 See Omar Abulqasim Alkikli, Op-Ed., In Tripoli, Blaring Horns and Shouts of Joy, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 21, 2011, at A35; MacFarquhar, supra note 2. 
4 Kareem Fahim et al., Qaddafi, Seized by Foes, Meets a Violent End, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 
2011, at A1. 
5 See id.; Libya: Investigate Deaths of Gaddafi and Son, supra note 2. 
6 See Fahim et al., supra note 4. The NTC is Libya’s interim government. CNN Wire Staff, 
U.N. Calls for Gadhafi Death Investigation, CNN (Oct. 21, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2011/10/21/world/africa/libya-main/. 
7 Fahim et al., supra note 4; CNN Wire Staff, supra note 6; Libya: Investigate Deaths of 
Gaddafi and Son, supra note 2. 
8 See Sarah Leah Whitson, Op-Ed., In Libya, Building the Rule of Law, Int’l Herald 
Trib., Dec. 30, 2011, at 6. 
9 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 87 (Greenwood Press 1982) (1963) (internal marks 
omitted). NTC Law number 38 grants amnesty for all acts pursuant to the February 2011 
revolution. See Chris Stephen, Libya’s New Penal Code: Same Old Story, Radio Neth. World 
wide (May 10, 2012, 1:07 PM), http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/libyas- new-
penal-code-same-old-story; infra text accompanying note 36. 
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should hold both sides of the Libyan conflict accountable for their ac-
tions. They can best do so through a hybridized truth commission10 
and trial approach, as has been used in other settings. 
I. Background 
A. Conditions in Libya During the Conflict and Immediately  
Following Gaddafi’s Death 
1. Conditions During the Conflict Prior to Gaddafi’s Death 
 February 17, 2011 marked Libya’s “day of revolt,” in which large-
scale protests erupted throughout the country.11 Gaddafi’s forces re-
sponded to these protests by using snipers, helicopters, and artillery on 
the crowds.12 Amid the protests, rebel fighter militias began to advance, 
only to be repelled by the Libyan military and Gaddafi’s threat to root 
out protesters “alley to alley, house to house.”13 Concerned with the 
Gaddafi regime’s gross human rights violations against civilians, the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted a resolution imposing a 
no-fly zone over Libya.14 Fighting continued for months, with rebels ad-
vancing throughout the country, taking Tripoli in August 2011, and go-
ing on to attack the pro-Gaddafi strongholds of Bani Walid and Surt.15 
                                                                                                                      
10 Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions, in Routledge Handbook of Interna-
tional Criminal Law 369, 372 (William A. Schabas & Nadia Bernaz eds., 2011). A Truth 
Commission has been defined as: 
An ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centered commission of inquiry set up in 
and authorized by a state for the primary purposes of (1) investigating and 
reporting on the principal causes and consequences of broad and relatively 
recent patterns of severe violence or repression that occurred in the state 
during determinate periods of abusive rule or conflict, and (2) making rec-
ommendations for their redress and future prevention. 
Id. 
11 See Battle for Libya: Key Moments, Al-Jazeera (Nov. 19, 2011, 1:47 PM), http://www. 
aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/libya/2011/10/20111020104244706760.html. 
12 Nick Meo, Gaddafi Sends in Snipers to Silence the Dissent, Sunday Telegraph (Lon-
don), Feb. 20, 2011, at 25, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/afri 
caandindianocean/libya/8335934/Libya-protests-140-massacred-as-Gaddafi-sends-in-snipers- 
to-crush-dissent.html. 
13 See Battle for Libya: Key Moments, supra note 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
14 S.C. Res. 1973, pmbl., ¶¶ 6–8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 3, 2011). 
15 Kareem Fahim, Rebels Pour into Central Tripoli Square, Declaring Victory: Instead of Bloody 
Struggle, a Headlong Rush into a Cheering but Wary Capital, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 2011, at A1; 
Rod Nordland, Qaddafi Strongholds Are Attacked, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 2011, at A4. See gener-
ally Battle for Libya: Key Moments, supra note 11 (detailing the events of seven months of 
conflict between the initial uprising and the fall of Tripoli). 
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The rebels then reportedly arrested, detained, and tortured African mi-
grants and dark-skinned Libyans alleged to be Gaddafi supporters, and 
systematically drove them out of cities such as Tawergha.16 
2. Gaddafi’s Death and Ensuing Conditions 
 Sources indicate that militia brigades from the city of Misrata are 
responsible for Gaddafi’s death and the execution of fifty-three of his 
supporters in mid-October 2011.17 Immediately following Gaddafi’s 
death, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, Human 
Rights Watch, and Amnesty International all called for an investigation 
into the matter.18 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC), stated in December 2011 that the man-
ner of Gaddafi’s death may have constituted a war crime; Moreno-
Ocampo is also investigating allegations that anti-Gaddafi forces and 
NATO committed war crimes during the conflict.19 
 The NTC agreed to investigate Gaddafi’s death20—though it has 
since focused on prosecuting Saif al-Islam el-Qaddafi, Muammar Gad-
dafi’s son, and Abdullah el-Senussi, Libya’s former intelligence chief
21— and announced its intention to create an investigative committee 
tasked with exploring and eventually prosecuting Gaddafi-era crimes.22 
Yet Libya has no effective justice system, and militia councils have re-
voked their pledge to lay down weapons until a new constitution is rati-
fied, thereby entrenching themselves as de facto local governments in 
Misrata, Tripoli, and other cities.23 As a result, militias are essentially un-
                                                                                                                      
 
16 Kareem Fahim & Adam Nossiter, In Libya, Massacre Site is Cleaned Up, Not Investigated, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 2011, at A4; Whitson, supra note 8; Daniel Williams, The Murder Bri-
gades of Misrata, Hum. Rts. Watch (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/ 
28/murder-brigades-misrata. 
17 Williams, supra note 16; Libya: Apparent Execution of 53 Gaddafi Supporters, Hum. Rts. 
Watch (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/24/libya-apparent-execution-
53-gaddafi-supporters. 
18 Kareem Fahim & Richard Gladstone, U.S. and U.N. Demand Details from Libyan Lead-
ers on How Qaddafi Died, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 2011, at A6. 
19 Gaddafi’s Death May Be a War Crime, Reuters (Dec. 16, 2011, 12:10 AM), http://www. 
reuters.com/article/2011/12/16/us-libya-icc-idUSTRE7BF08820111216. 
20 Id. 
21 Marlise Simons, At Hague, Libya Insists It Should Try Qaddafi Son, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 
2012, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/world/africa/libya-insists-on- 
trying-seif-al-islam-el-qaddafi.html. 
22See Adam Nossiter, On Road to Reconciliation, Libya Meets Trail of Anguish, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 4, 2011, at A4. 
23 See David D. Kirkpatrick, In Libya, Fighting May Outlast the Revolution, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
2, 2011, at A4; David D. Kirkpatrick, Libya Begins Plan to Elect Assembly, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 
2012, at A8; Nossiter, supra note 22; Simons, supra note 21 (“But if [Libya] wants to abide 
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constrained, and the likelihood of additional atrocities remains high.24 
Allegations of arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and displacement 
continue, leading NTC Chairman Mustafa Abdel-Jalil to warn that the 
lack of control over rival militias could lead to civil war.25 
                                                                                                                     
 In January 2012, Abdel-Jalil’s warnings began to crystallize: pro-
testers ransacked the NTC’s main offices in Benghazi following the 
publication of a draft election law.26 The protesters accused the interim 
government of lacking transparency and having past ties to the Gaddafi 
regime.27 In early February 2012, approximately 100 western Libyan 
militias united in a federation with the aim of pressuring the NTC to 
continue reform.28 In light of the NTC’s inability to control these mili-
tias, they maintain custody of three-quarters of war detainees,29 refuse 
to bring some to trial,30 and continue using torture and other abusive 
practices.31 In March 2012, militia and tribal leaders in the oil-rich east-
ern region declared their intention to establish their own govern-
ment.32 These leaders seek a return to pre-Gaddafi federalism, and 
demand their own legislature, courts, and police.33 Such increased de-
mand for regional autonomy threatens the NTC’s plan to form a con-
stituent assembly,34 especially because the NTC is seemingly unwilling 
and unable to use force against unified eastern leaders.35 On May 3, 
2012, the NTC legislatively granted amnesty to rebels for revolutionary 
 
by rules of the international court and the will of the Security Council, it must first con-
vince the judges that Libya is willing and able to hold fair trials.”). 
24 See Libya: Make Urgent Justice System Reforms, Hum. Rts. Watch (Dec. 22, 2011), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/22/libya-make-urgent-justice-system-reforms (highlight-
ing continued abuse of detainees and the NTC’s lack of control over militias). 
25 J. David Goodman, Libyan Leader Says Militia Clashes Could Create Civil War, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 5, 2012, at A10; Whitson, supra note 8. 
26 See Liam Stack, Libya Protests Spur Shake-Up in Interim Government, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 
2012, at A8. 
27 Id. 
28 Libya: Western Militias Unite, Posing Challenge to Transitional Government, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 14, 2012, at A8. 
29 See Libya: Former Rebels Retain Prisoners, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2012, at A8. 
30 Delays in a Trial Show Libya’s Legal Disarray, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 2012, at A10. 
31 Libya: ‘Out of Control’ Militias Commit Widespread Abuses, a Year on from Uprising, Am-
nesty Int’l (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/libya-out-control-militias-
commit-widespread-abuses-year-uprising-2012-02-15. 
32 Suliman Ali Alzway & David D. Kirkpatrick, Eastern Libya Demands Measure of Auton-
omy in a Loose National Federation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 2012, at A6. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Libya: Leader Says Force Against Tribal Leaders Isn’t Possible, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 2012, at 
A6. 
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acts.36 As of October 2012, Libya had dismissed the prime minister 
elected less than a month earlier,37 again attempted to dissolve unau-
thorized militias,38 and witnessed an armed assault on the U.S. diplo-
matic mission which resulted in the killing of Ambassador J. Christo-
pher Stevens and three members of his staff.39 
B. Is Libya Mid-Revolution? 
 Commentators have used several terms to refer to the Libyan con-
flict, including: uprising,40 revolt,41 rebellion,42 civil war,43 and revolu-
tion.44 Categorizing the ongoing social and political change in Libya is 
important to analyze its future implications or compare it with previous 
conflicts.45 Among the terms used, the Libyan conflict most likely 
seems to be a “revolution,” which has been defined as “[a]n overthrow 
of a government, usu[ally] resulting in fundamental political change; a 
successful rebellion.”46 “Revolution,” however, is often used liberally, 
                                                                                                                      
36 Stephen, supra note 9. 
37 David D. Kirkpatrick, Libya’s Prime Minister Is Dismissed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 2012, at 
A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/world/africa/libyas-prime-minister-
is-dismissed.html. 
38 David D. Kirkpatrick, Government Issues Order to Disband Libya Forces, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
23, 2012, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/24/world/africa/libya-orders- 
unauthorized-militias-to-disband.html. 
39 David D. Kirkpatrick & Steven Lee Myers, Libya Attack Brings Challenge for U.S., N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 12, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/13/world/ 
middleeast/us-envoy-to-libya-is-reported-killed.html. 
40 E.g., Peter Kenyon, In Post-Gadhafi Libya, Enmities Continue to Smolder, NPR (Nov. 9, 2011, 
12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/09/142100954/in-post-gadhafi-libya-enmities-con 
tinue-to-smolder; Timeline: Libya’s Uprising Against Muammar Gaddafi, Reuters (Aug. 22, 2011, 
9:01 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/22/us-libya-events-idUSTRE77K2QH201 
10822. 
41 E.g., Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, As Tide Turns, Rebels’ Dream of ‘Free Libya’ Dims, NPR (Mar. 
16, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/16/134594253/as-tide-turns-rebels-dream- 
of-free-libya-dims. 
42 E.g., Leaders of the Libyan Rebellion, N.Y. Times, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2011/08/21/world/africa/leaders-of-the-libyan-rebellion.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2011). 
43 E.g., Timeline: Libya’s Uprising Against Muammar Gaddafi, supra note 40. 
44 E.g., Gerntholtz, supra note 2. 
45 See L. Christian Marlin, A Lesson Unlearned: The Unjust Revolution in Rwanda, 1959–
1961, 12 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1271, 1294, 1296–99 (1998) (determining that Rwandan 
political and social change from 1959–61 was a revolution rather than a civil war in order 
to further analyze the change itself). 
46 Black’s Law Dictionary 1435 (9th ed. 2009); see also David Kirkpatrick, Libya Be-
gins to Elect Assembly, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 2012, at A8 (demonstrating Libya’s fundamental 
political change through new laws establishing democratic procedures). 
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applied to everything from the “Social Media Revolution”47 to the 
“Sexual Revolution.”48 In a political and legal context, revolution is de-
fined in varying ways, and with more nuance than in the mainstream 
definition.49 
                                                                                                                     
 In politics or law, classifying an event as a revolution is not a 
straightforward task: “[a]fter the big two—the French Revolution and 
the Russian Revolution—social scientists find it hard to agree on oth-
ers.”50 For example, some would include the American Revolution but 
not the Glorious Revolution of 1688.51 Despite such disagreement on 
classification, many revolutionary scholars agree on five necessary ele-
ments of a successful revolution: “(1) mass frustration resulting in pop-
ular uprisings among urban or rural populations; (2) dissident elite 
political movements; (3) unifying motivations; (4) a severe political cri-
sis paralyzing the administrative and coercive capabilities of the state; 
and (5) a permissive or tolerant world context.”52 Together, these five 
elements combine to create what Samuel Huntington describes as “a 
rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant val-
ues and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, 
leadership, and government activity and policies.”53 
 Historian Parviz Daneshvar, determining whether the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution qualified as a revolution, provides a comprehensive survey of 
revolutionary theory, divided into three general schools of thought: The 
first theory, which includes Huntington’s definition, emphasizes that a 
revolution transforms a state’s social, political, and value structure.54 
 
47 E.g., Sara Toth, Social Media Revolution, Balt. Sun, Dec. 12, 2011, http://articles.balti 
moresun.com/2011-12-12/explore/bs-exho-social-media-revolution-20111212_1_social-media- 
facebook-and-twitter-facebook-users. 
48 E.g., Lawrence L. Shornack & Ellen McRoberts Shornack, The New Sex Education and 
the Sexual Revolution: A Critical View, 31 Fam. Rel. 531, 531 (1982). 
49 See, e.g., Marlin, supra note 45, at 1294–97. 
50 See James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History 286 (2d ed. 2008). 
51 Id. 
52 Marlin, supra note 45, at 1295 (citing several scholars as the source of this test). 
53 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies 264 (1968). 
Notably, Huntington states that revolutions are 
distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of inde-
pendence. A coup d’etat in itself changes only leadership and perhaps poli-
cies; a rebellion or insurrection may change policies, leadership, and political 
institutions, but not social structure and values; a war of independence is a 
struggle of one community against rule by an alien community and does not 
necessarily involve changes in the social structure of either community. 
Id. 
54 Parviz Daneshvar, Revolution in Iran 178–79 (1996). 
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Marxist theory fits within this tradition; it attributes revolution-induced 
societal changes to class struggle and the resultant shift from “an exist-
ing mode of production to a new one.”55 Other scholars who endorse a 
class-based definition of revolution note a distinction between social 
revolution and merely political revolution.56 They argue that social revo-
lutions entail unique factors, including overlaps between political 
change, social transformation, and class upheaval.57 In this view, class-
based revolts from below drive social revolutions to ultimately result in 
the “rapid, basic transformation of a society’s state and class structure.”58 
 Daneshvar’s second category of revolutionary theory grounds rev-
olutions’ seismic shifts in nations’ political and legal contexts.59 Within 
this theory, some scholars state that while revolutions generate societal 
upheaval, they are nonetheless “regular political activity . . . subject to 
certain general rules about the amount and quantity of force employed 
on each side.”60 Others argue, however, that rather than being “regular 
political activity,” revolutions are special social changes, but still “must 
be studied within the context of the social systems in which they oc-
cur.”61 
 Daneshvar’s third category of revolutionary theory is rooted pre-
dominantly in the work of Hannah Arendt.62 Arendt’s definition of 
revolution recognizes the “basic ingredients of revolution” that other 
scholars do, but goes further by requiring freedom as a revolutionary 
goal.63 Arendt notes that revolutions are conceptually distinct from 
“successful insurrections.”64 Civil wars, factional strife, and coups d’état, 
among other phenomena, are often associated with revolution because 
their common denominator is the violence that accompanies them.65 
Arendt asserts that violence is no more appropriate an indicator of rev-
olution than is change; in order to qualify as a revolution, the goal of 
such violence must be freedom: 
[O]nly where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, 
where violence is used to constitute an altogether different 
                                                                                                                      
55 Id. at 178. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 Id. 
59 See id. at 178–79. 
60 Daneshvar, supra note 54, at 178–79. 
61 See id. at 179. 
62 See, e.g., id. at 179–80. 
63 See Arendt, supra note 9, at 25–28; Daneshvar, supra note 54, at 179. 
64 See Arendt, supra note 9, at 27. 
65 Id. at 27–28. 
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form of government, to bring about the formation of a new 
body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at least 
at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution.66 
 The term “revolution” appropriately describes Libya’s current situa-
tion, given the term’s basic requirements and the above scholarly defini-
tions.67 First, mass uprisings and fighting by the numerous anti-Gaddafi 
militias tore through the country, starting in February 2011.68 Second, 
NTC members were former Gaddafi-regime elites that defected once 
the revolution began.69 Third, the goals of ending Gaddafi’s rule and 
creating a free Libya unified the Libyan people.70 Finally, the combina-
tion of the broader context of the “Arab Spring,”71 international politi-
cal pressure, and armed intervention all hindered Gaddafi’s govern-
ment and fostered the necessary “permissive” context that enabled anti-
Gaddafi forces to succeed.72 
C. The Tradition of Revolutionary Violence 
 Libya’s turmoil—if indeed a revolution73—joins the ranks of revo-
lutions preceding it that have been lawless and violent, with significant 
risk that current conditions may descend into further chaos.74 Most 
scholars agree on one point: violence is inseparable from the general 
                                                                                                                      
66 Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
67 See id. at 27–28; Huntington, supra note 53, at 264; Marlin, supra note 45, at 1295–
96 (highlighting the five factors necessary for a successful revolution); supra notes 53, 66 
and accompanying text. 
68 See Marlin, supra note 45, at 1295 (“(1) mass frustration resulting in popular upris-
ings”); Battle for Libya: Key Moments, supra note 11. 
69 See Marlin, supra note 45, at 1295 (“(2) dissident elite political movements”); Leaders 
of the Libyan Rebellion, supra note 42 (“The Libyan rebels fighting to topple Col. Muammar 
el-Qaddafi are led by longtime opponents of the Qaddafi government as well as officials 
who defected once the rebellion began.”). 
70 See Marlin, supra note 45, at 1295 (“(3) unifying motivations”); Garcia-Navarro, supra 
note 41 (“[The rebels’] strength . . . lie[s] in their diversity, in their willingness to fight and 
to die for the right to live outside of Gadhafi’s brutal autocratic grip.”). 
71 Craig Whitlock, Libyan Rebels Renew Hopes of Arab Spring, Wash. Post, Aug. 23, 2011, 
at A09. 
72 See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 14, pmbl., ¶¶ 6–8 (authorizing the use of force against 
Libya); Marlin, supra note 45, at 1295–96 (“(4) a severe political crisis paralyzing the . . . 
state; and (5) a permissive or tolerant world context”); Leaders of the Libyan Rebellion, supra 
note 42. 
73 See supra Part I.B. 
74 See Arendt, supra note 9, at 87, 111; Goodman, supra note 25. Arendt notes that the 
American Revolution is a conspicuous exception to this general rule. See Arendt, supra 
note 9, at 87, 114–15. 
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concept of revolution.75 Indeed, a brief sample of universally recog-
nized revolutions verifies this observation and provides perspective on 
events in Libya.76 
1. The French Revolution 
 The French Revolution is considered one of the paradigmatic rev-
olutions in recent history.77 In 1788, amid a crumbling economy and 
withering government authority, the first spasms of revolutionary vio-
lence broke out in France as protesters demanded a representative as-
sembly known as the Estates-General be convened.78 Tension surround-
ing the economic crisis and the Estates-General’s elections catalyzed 
widespread riots and insurrections throughout the country.79 This so-
cial agitation culminated in the storming of the Bastille, a fortress and 
prison in Paris, on July 14, 1789.80 The crowd lynched military officials 
and “[t]heir severed heads were carried through the streets in a gory 
celebration of the popular victory.”81 
 After the storming of the Bastille, the “Great Fear” ensued as peas-
ants killed nobles and burned châteaux.82 France instituted political 
change in the months and years following, including the Declaration 
on the Rights of Man and the Citizen,83 but revolutionary violence still 
persisted.84 In October 1789, female marchers seized cannons to march 
on Versailles, killing several palace guards.85 In 1791, the military shot 
approximately sixty demonstrators in the massacre of the Champs-de-
Mars.86 Domestic social unrest continued, France engaged in war, and 
revolutionary militants created ad hoc tribunals and summarily exe-
                                                                                                                      
75 See Daneshvar, supra note 54, at 179–80. 
76 See 1 Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution: 1917–1923, at 99 
(1951); Daneshvar, supra note 54, at 101–02, 111, 131–32; Robert V. Daniels, Red Oc-
tober: The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, at 189, 201–03 (1967); Gelvin, supra note 
50, at 286; Jeremy D. Popkin, A Short History of the French Revolution 30–34, 43 
(5th ed. 2010). 
77 See Gelvin, supra note 50, at 286 (referring to the French and Russian Revolutions 
as the “big two”). 
78 Popkin, supra note 76, at 24–25. 
79 Id. at 30–31. 
80 Id. at 31–32. 
81 Id. at 32. 
82 See id. at 33–34. 
83 See id. at 37. The Declaration on the Rights of Man and the Citizen, adopted by the 
National Assembly on August 26, 1789, set forth “the fundamental principles of a new 
society based on equality and individual rights.” Id. at 37. 
84 See Popkin, supra note 76, at 43, 56. 
85 Id. at 42–43. 
86 Id. at 56. 
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cuted about 1300 people.87 In 1792, the revolutionary government exe-
cuted the King by guillotine as a rebellion in the rural west grew into a 
“veritable civil war, waged with unrelenting cruelty on both sides.”88 
The “Great Terror” then took root and remained until 1794, when 
Maximilien Robespierre and his followers were led to the guillotine.89 
2. The Bolshevik (Russian) Revolution 
 The Bolshevik (Russian) Revolution of 1917 is also widely recog-
nized as a revolution,90 and though the transfer of power between the 
Provisional Government91 and the Bolsheviks92 was unexpectedly “al-
most bloodless,” fighting between the sides still occurred.93 Bolshevik 
leader Vladimir Lenin believed that violence in the form of an armed 
insurrection was necessary to effectuate the Bolsheviks’ desired chang-
es;94 accordingly, the Bolsheviks’ storming of the Winter Palace95 re-
quired hours of artillery attack.96 In response, the Provisional Govern-
ment’s former prime minister instigated a counterrevolutionary revolt, 
resulting in a battle “with many more casualties than occurred in the 
capture of the Winter Palace.”97 
 Although violence during the Bolshevik Revolution was limited, 
“[d]ecades of bloodshed, labor and suffering lay ahead for the Russian 
people,” beginning with violent contests between the powerful forces 
opposing the Bolsheviks.98 The drive to consolidate authority through-
out Russia sparked prolonged violence: in Moscow, Bolsheviks massa-
cred Kremlin soldiers during the fight for the city, while the Ukraine, 
Tiflis, and Russian-speaking Cossack regions fiercely resisted Bolshevik 
                                                                                                                      
87 Id. at 66, 68. 
88 Id. at 73–75. 
89 Id. at 89–91. 
90 See Gelvin, supra note 50, at 286; Huntington, supra note 53, at 264. 
91 Carr, supra note 76, at 70. The Provisional Government took power after the over-
throw of the Romanov Dynasty in February 1917 (the “February revolution”). Id. 
92 Robert Service, The Bolshevik Party, in Critical Companion to the Russian Revo-
lution: 1914–1921, at 231, 231 (Edward Acton et al. eds., 1997) (“The Bolsheviks were the 
political party that triumphed in the October revolution of 1917. They founded a Soviet 
state and announced that the era of European socialist revolution had arrived.”). 
93 See Carr, supra note 76, at 86, 98–99 (highlighting the Bolsheviks’ military prepara-
tion and expectation that they would assume power only after a violent struggle). 
94 See id. at 86. 
95 Daniels, supra note 76, at 42. Petrograd’s Winter Palace was previously the Tsar’s of-
ficial residence and became the seat of the Provisional Government. Id. 
96 Id. at 189 (chronicling the bombardment of the Winter Palace, starting at approxi-
mately 9:30 PM and ending at approximately 2:00 AM the following day). 
97 See id. at 201–05. 
98 Id. at 201, 203; see Carr, supra note 76, at 99. 
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dominance in what became a three-year civil war.99 By 1920, 700,000 
Russians were listed as dead or missing, 250,000 of whom were con-
firmed as killed in the course of combat.100 The Revolution and its af-
ter-effects thus entailed significant bloodshed, even though the initial 
power transfer required little physical force.101 
3. The Iranian Revolution 
 The Iranian Revolution of 1979 also provides an illustrative exam-
ple of revolutionary violence.102 In 1978, Iran saw drastic inflation, wa-
ter and electricity shortages, heightened economic inequality, and a 
monarchy that insisted on ruling with absolute power.103 Citizens took 
to the streets, and the Shah’s security forces responded with brutality, 
often firing on protesters.104 After a lull in violence, an explosion kill-
ing 400 people in a movie theatre with locked emergency exits spurred 
widespread riots and street protests.105 By December 1978, thousands 
of Iranians had been killed in the protests.106 
                                                                                                                     
 Even after the Shah transferred power to an interim government 
led by resistance leader Shapour Bakhtiar, strikes and protest marches 
continued, resulting in more deaths.107 Upon Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini’s celebrated return to Iran and his naming of a new gov-
ernment, the Iranian Air Force, “[s]upported by thousands of armed 
anti-government civilians,” fought pro-Shah forces.108 The Iranian mili-
tary then declared neutrality and its command disintegrated.109 The 
revolutionaries seized power shortly thereafter.110 
 Similar to France and Russia, Iranian revolutionary forces began 
consolidating authority throughout the country immediately after the 
change in power.111 They established the Revolutionary Courts, Revolu-
 
99 Daniels, supra note 76, at 207–208. 
100 See Evan Mawdsley, The Civil War: The Military Campaigns, in Critical Companion 
to the Russian Revolution: 1914–1921, supra note 92, at 93, 102. 
101 See Carr, supra note 76, at 99; Daniels, supra note 76, at 201, 203. 
102 See Daneshvar, supra note 54, at 180. 
103 Id. at 97; Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah 186–88 (1980). 
104 See Daneshvar, supra note 54, at 101–02. 
105 See id. at 105, 107–08. 
106 Id. at 111. 
107 Id. at 114, 116. 
108 Id. at 124–25. 
109 See id. at 125. 
110 See Daneshvar, supra note 54, at 125. 
111 See id. at 128; Daniels, supra note 76, at 201, 203, 207–208; Popkin, supra note 76, 
at 66, 68; Mawdsley, supra note 100, at 102. 
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tionary Guard, and Revolutionary Council.112 The Council was vested 
with both supreme executive and legislative authority.113 Additionally, 
Revolutionary Committees—akin to small militias led by individual mul-
lahs—emerged throughout the country, including over 1500 in Tehran 
alone.114 
 Iran was overtaken by lawlessness, as civilian militias seized over 
300,000 small arms and roamed the country, capturing and killing sus-
pected counter-revolutionaries or members of the old regime.115 The 
Revolutionary Courts carried out spontaneous trials, charging and even-
tually executing many innocent individuals for crimes such as “war 
against God” and “corrupt[ion] on earth.”116 In the months and years 
following the revolution and consolidation, the government purged the 
Iranian armed forces, the Iran-Iraq war plunged the country into mili-
tary conflict for almost a decade, and hundreds of thousands of refugees 
fled Iran.117 
4. Is There Law During a Revolution? 
 Commentators have come to accept that pervasive violence is a 
necessary factor of revolution118—the violent revolt against the existing 
legal and political order, geared toward the establishment of an entirely 
new order.119 It is therefore necessary to determine what law, if any, 
governs actors when a revolution occurs, or whether the opposite is 
true, and the repudiation of l’ancien régime coupled with the idea that 
all “must be permitted to those who act in the revolutionary direction” 
suspends legal constraints on actors in the revolutionary context.120 
                                                                                                                      
 
112 Daneshvar, supra note 54, at 128. 
113 Id. at 133. 
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organize protests . . . .”). 
115 Id. at 131–32. 
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II. Discussion 
A. International Humanitarian Law 
 The body of international humanitarian law is an important con-
straint on the waging of armed conflict.121 There are two main branches 
of international humanitarian law: the law of The Hague122 and the law 
of Geneva.123 In the area most applicable to revolutions, the 1949 Ge-
neva Convention set forth rules for internal armed conflict.124 Article 3 
therein defines internal armed conflict as “armed conflict not of an in-
ternational character occurring in the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties.”125 The Convention prohibits the mistreatment of 
“[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de 
combat126 by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.”127 It also 
proscribes the following acts: murder, mutilation, torture, hostage-
                                                                                                                      
Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law 11 (3d ed. 
2001) (showing international humanitarian law’s applicability to armed conflict). 
121 Kalshoven & Zegveld, supra note 120, at 11. 
122 Id. at 19. The law of The Hague includes the 1899 First Hague Peace Conference 
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annexed Regula-
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Hague Peace Conference dealt with advances of wartime techniques and naval warfare. See 
id. at 23. 
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personnel on the battlefield. See id. at 27. These rules included a requirement that medical 
personnel be distinguished by a uniform with a white cross on a red background and that 
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regulations from the 1899 Hague Conference. Id. This treaty added an outright prohibi-
tion “on reprisals against prisoners of war.” Id. at 28. 
124 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 287 U.N.T.S. 1950 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Con-
vention]. 
125 Id. 
126 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Glossary: Terms Used in EHL 7 (2009), available at 
http://ehl.redcross.org/resources/downloads/glossary.pdf. Hors de combat, literally meaning 
“‘out of the fight’ . . . describes combatants who have been captured or wounded or who are 
sick or shipwrecked, or who have laid down their arms and surrendered, and thus are no 
longer in a position to fight.” Id. 
127 1949 Geneva Convention, supra note 124, art. 3(I). 
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taking, “outrages upon personal dignity,” and summary executions.128 
On May 22, 1956, Libya acceded to the 1949 Geneva Convention.129 
B. International Criminal Law 
 Beyond international humanitarian law, the ICC’s jurisdiction may 
also extend to the revolutionary context.130 The Rome Statute estab-
lishing the ICC sets forth the conditions to the court’s exercise of juris-
diction in prosecuting war crimes and atrocities.131 The court may ex-
ercise its jurisdiction over states that ratify or accede to the Rome 
Statute, and over situations that have been referred to the court.132 
State parties (pursuant to Article 14 of the Rome Statute), the UN Se-
curity Council (acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter), and the 
Prosecutor, acting proprio motu, can each make referrals to the ICC.133 
                                                                                                                     
 Libya is not currently among the 121 states party to the Rome Stat-
ute,134 but on February 26, 2011, the UN Security Council acted under 
 
128 Id. art. 3(I)(a)–(d). A summary execution is one “conducted without the customary 
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(last visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
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Chapter VII to refer the situation in Libya to the court.135 After an inves-
tigation, the Prosecutor issued warrants on June 27, 2011, for Muammar 
Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (then the de facto Prime Minister), and 
Abdullah Al-Senussi (then the head of Military Intelligence).136 
 The ICC has subject-matter jurisdiction over several crimes that 
may occur during a revolution, including genocide, crimes against hu-
manity, and war crimes.137 The definitions of these crimes encompass 
many individual acts, such as torture, killing a prisoner of war, or deny-
ing prisoners their right to a fair trial.138 
 Under the Rome Statute, any grave breach of the Geneva Conven-
tion is a war crime.139 The two treaties, however, are distinct: whereas 
the Geneva Convention focuses on individual combatant behavior, the 
Rome Statute is primarily geared toward “leadership crimes of signifi-
cant magnitude.”140 Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute sets forth the 
“particularity requirement,” stating that “[t]he Court shall have juris-
diction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of 
a plan or policy or as a part of a large-scale commission of such 
crimes.”141 As a result, the particularity requirement is a frequent an-
chor of the court’s jurisdiction.142 
                                                                                                                     
C. Other International Law and Regional Law 
 While the UN Security Council possesses the “primary responsibil-
ity for the maintenance of international peace and security,” its past 
practice demonstrates direct involvement in domestic conflicts.143 The 
 
 
135 S.C. Res. 1970, pmbl., ¶¶ 4–8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
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01/11-01/11, Decision to Terminate the Case Against Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar 
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Security Council has taken several steps to affect events in Libya.144 
These steps include referring the situation to the ICC, enforcing an 
arms embargo, imposing a no-fly zone and asset freeze, subjecting spec-
ified individuals to travel restrictions, and authorizing military interven-
tion.145 The Security Council has also worked closely with other organi-
zations in this case, particularly the African Union (AU) and the 
League of Arab States (Arab League), and has established the UN Sup-
port Mission in Libya to assist the country’s post-conflict phase.146 The 
Security Council can create an ad hoc international criminal tribunal if 
it decides the action is warranted, as it did with the International Crim-
inal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).147 
 Libya is a member of the Arab League and the AU.148 Arab states 
created the Arab League, in part, to “draw closer the relations between 
[them] and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing 
a close collaboration.”149 The League’s policy coordination emphasizes 
                                                                                                                      
Rev. 138, 147–51 (1994) (noting the Security Council’s shift in the early 1990s from non-
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144 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2022, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2022 (Dec. 2, 2011) (“ex-
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provisions of Security Council Resolution 1973); S.C. Res. 2009, ¶¶ 12, 14–15, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/2009 (Sept. 16, 2011) (establishing the mandate for the UN Support Mission in 
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National Oil Corporation and several Libyan banks); S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 14, ¶¶ 4, 6, 
13, 19, 22, annexes I–II (imposing a no-fly zone, arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze 
for certain government officials, and authorizing member states to “take all necessary 
measures . . . to protect civilians”). 
145 See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 14, ¶¶ 4, 6, 13, 19, 22; S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 135, 
pmbl., ¶¶ 4–8. 
146 S.C. Res. 2009, supra note 144, pmbl., ¶ 12; S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 14, pmbl., ¶ 5 
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Gaddafi regime). 
147 See William A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The For-
mer Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone 48 (2006). Given the referral of the situa-
tion in Libya to the ICC, and the fact that the ICC was established to create a more per-
manent justice system for international war crimes, creation of a Libya tribunal is unlikely, 
though still possible. See S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 135, pmbl., ¶¶ 4–8; Schabas, supra, at 
48. 
148 Member States, League Arab States, http://www.lasportal.org/wps/portal/las_en/ 
home_page/ (select “About LAS” from the left menu; then select “Member States”) (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Member States: League of Arab States]; Member States, Afr. 
Union, http://www.au.int/en/member_states/countryprofiles (last visited Mar. 8, 2013) 
[hereinafter Member States: African Union]. 
149 Pact of the League of Arab States art. 2, Mar. 22, 1945, 70 U.N.T.S. 237. 
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economic and financial policy, communications, nationality issues, 
health problems, and social affairs.150 Each state has one vote on the 
League Council, which “realiz[es] the purpose of the League and . . . 
supervis[es] the execution of [its] agreements.”151 Under Article 7 of 
the Pact of the Arab League, the organization’s founding treaty, unani-
mous Council decisions are binding on all member states.152 Majority 
decisions of the Council are binding only on those states that voted in 
favor of them.153 All decisions of the Council are enforced “in each 
member state according to its respective basic laws.”154 
 The Arab League contributed to the course of the Libyan con-
flict.155 It suspended Libya’s membership and began communicating 
with the NTC—rather than the Gaddafi regime—soon after hostilities 
began in early 2011.156 Additionally, the League recommended the no-
fly zone over the country, paving the way for Security Council Resolu-
tion 1973.157 The uniqueness and force of the Arab League’s decision 
carried particular weight with other nations and the UN Security 
Council.158 
 The AU, has goals similar to those of the Arab League.159 Among 
the AU’s stated objectives are achieving “greater unity . . . between the 
African countries,” safeguarding sovereignty, and “[p]romot[ing] de-
mocratic principles and institutions.”160 Other objectives include “pro-
mot[ing] peace, security, and stability on the continent; . . . pro-
mot[ing] and protect[ing] human and peoples’ rights in accordance 
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159 Compare The Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 3(a)–(b), (g), July 11, 2000, 
2158 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AU Constitutive Act] (The AU seeks to “[a]chieve greater 
unity and solidarity between the African countries and . . . [d]efend the sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity and independence of its Member States . . . .”), with Pact of the League of 
Arab States, supra note 149, pmbl. (stating an intention “to strengthen the close relations 
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and sovereignty of these States”). 
160 AU Constitutive Act, supra note 159, art. 3(a)–(b), (g). 
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with . . . relevant human rights instruments;” and “encourag[ing] in-
ternational cooperation, taking due account of the UN Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”161 
 The AU is not as clear as the Arab League regarding the extent to 
which decisions bind member states.162 The AU’s Constitutive Act does 
note, however, that a member state may be subject to sanctions should 
it refuse to comply with the AU’s policy decisions.163 While its decisions 
may not necessarily bind member states, the AU still wields influence 
and has the potential to affect actors in Libya.164 The AU has been a 
focus of several Security Council resolutions, including those pertinent 
to the Libya situation; additionally, its Peace and Security Council has 
created a “High-Level ad hoc Committee on Libya.”165 
 In addition to regional organizations, Libya is also a member of 
the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).166 The objectives set 
forth in the OIC’s Charter include “promot[ing] and protect[ing] hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms including the rights of women, 
children, youth, elderly and people with special needs as well as the 
preservation of Islamic family values,” and “reaffirm[ing] its support 
for the rights of peoples as stipulated in the UN Charter and interna-
tional law.”167 The OIC, endowed with a Permanent Mission to the UN, 
can make itself heard at the Security Council and among other mem-
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the Islamic Conference. See About OIC, Org. Islamic Cooperation, http://www.oic-oci. 
org/page_detail.asp?p_id=52 (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
167 Org. of Islamic Cooperation [OIC] Charter art. 1, paras. 7, 14, available at http:// 
www.oic-oci.org/english/charter/OIC%20Charter-new-en.pdf. 
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ber states, as evidenced during the international community’s reaction 
to the situation in Libya.168 
D. Libyan Domestic Law and Custom 
 The NTC adopted the transitional Constitutional Declaration on 
August 3, 2011; its principles currently govern Libya.169 The Declara-
tion guarantees the following to all Libyans: 
Libyans shall be equal before the law. They shall enjoy equal 
civil and political rights, shall have the same opportunities, 
and be subject to the same public duties and obligations, 
without discrimination due to religion, doctrine, language, 
wealth, race, kinship, political opinions, and social status, trib-
al or eminent or familial loyalty. 
. . . . 
Human rights and . . . basic freedoms shall be respected by 
the State. The state shall commit itself to join the interna-
tional and regional declarations and charters which protect 
such rights and freedoms. The State shall endeavor to prom-
ulgate new charters which shall honor the human being as be-
ing [Allah]'s successor on Earth.170 
 Over the past several decades, Libya has acceded to several treaties 
and made certain legislative changes that could demonstrate state prac-
tice and custom in conformity with international norms respecting hu-
man rights.171 According to the International Committee of the Red 
                                                                                                                      
 
168 See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 14, pmbl.; S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 135, pmbl.; OIC Del-
egation, Permanent Mission Org. Islamic Conf., http://www.oic-un.org/oic_delegation. 
asp (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
169 See Interim Transitional Nat’l Council, The Constitutional Declaration 
pmbl. (2011) (Libya) [hereinafter Libya Const. Declaration 2011], available at http:// 
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170 Id. arts. 6–7. 
171 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (Libya acceded May 16, 1989); Convention 
on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Human-
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Libya acceded May 15, 
1970); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(Libya acceded May 15, 1970); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Libya acceded May 16, 1989); International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 
U.N.T.S. 195 (Libya acceded July 3, 1968); Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Military Penal Code, Int’l 
Humanitarian L., http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/WebLAW!OpenView (click the arrow 
next to “Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (the)”; then click next to “Military Penal Code (extracts)”; 
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Cross, Libya recently made legislative changes that further improved its 
conformity with such norms.172 According to Article 56 of the Libyan 
Military Penal Code, “[a]nyone who abandons kills or harms a wounded 
under his custody, shall be punished by death.”173 Outside the military 
realm, the Gaddafi regime claimed that its “Criminal Code guarantees 
respect for the human person and prohibits all forms of physical and 
mental torture.”174 Several state laws aimed to guarantee the right to a 
fair trial.175 Article 60 of the Libyan Code of Criminal Procedure for 
Armed Personnel states that “after hearing prosecution witnesses, the 
[court] shall hear defense witnesses, followed by the defendant and the 
prosecution.176 The defendant is entitled to examine said witnesses once 
again to clarify the facts subject of their testimony.”177 Under Article 64 
of the same Code, a defendant is also entitled to an interpreter if he or 
she does not understand Arabic.178 
 In addition to the preceding indicators of custom, the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya179 signed on to several treaties.180 These include the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional 
Protocol, the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limita-
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173 Libyan Military Penal Code Extracts, supra note 171. 
174 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 
40 of the Covenant, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/LBY/4 (May 10, 2007). 
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5425.htm#history (last updated Jan. 15, 2013). Italy invaded the territory containing Libya 
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note 169, art. 1; see also U.S. Relations with Libya, supra. 
180 See supra note 171 (listing relevant treaties to which Libya has acceded). 
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tions to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, and the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.181 
E. Islamic Law 
 Both Gaddafi-era and revolutionary actors have utilized Islamic law 
in developing their respective laws and policies.182 Libya’s 1951 Consti-
tution, establishing the country as a constitutional monarchy under 
King Idris, declared Islam to be the state religion and stipulated that 
only Muslims could serve as deputies or regents to the king.183 Under 
Gaddafi’s Libya, religion played a different role, as Gaddafi encouraged 
ordinary Libyans to learn the Quran rather than cede legitimacy to re-
ligious scholars.184 The NTC’s transitional constitutional proclamation, 
which revokes prior constitutional documents, likewise emphasizes Is-
lamic jurisprudence (Sharia) as a source of law and Islam as the na-
tional religion.185 
 While much of the scholarship pertaining to Islamic law of war 
focuses on jihad as it applies to non-believers,186 some also addresses the 
question of whether Islamic law of war applies to rebellions or revolu-
tions.187 Based on general scholarly consensus and interpretations of 
hadith,188 Islamic law largely prohibits rising up against a political ruler 
at all, but it is not completely prohibited: traditional Islam requires an 
uprising against a leader who openly declares or acts in a way that un-
deniably confirms his kufr, or “unbelief” in Islam.189 Kufr consists of a 
complete repudiation of Islam, one of Islam’s fundamental pillars, or of 
the integrity of the Prophet, but is not to be confused with a sin such as 
“being too lazy to pray.”190 
                                                                                                                      
181 See sources cited supra note 171. 
182 See Libya Const. Declaration 2011, supra note 169, art. 1; Nicholas Hagger, 
The Libyan Revolution 101 (2009). 
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184 Hagger, supra note 182, at 101. 
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Law of War 9–11 (2009). 
187 See id. at 47. 
188 M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources, Interpretation, and Rule-
Making, 1 UCLA J. Islamic & Near E. L. 135, 150–52 (2002). Hadith is a subset of Sharia 
law, second in authority to the Quran, which is comprised of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
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189 Royal Aal Al-Bayt Inst. for Islamic Thought, supra note 186, at 48, 50, 52. 
190 Id. at 48–49. 
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 In contrast, according to the same interpretation, Muslims should 
not rise up against a political ruler who does not declare his kufr, re-
gardless of his conduct.191 The reasoning behind this prohibition lies in 
the notion that revolutions bring about more “resulting strife, bloodlet-
ting, and corruption,” than that which they seek to end.192 Instead, 
Muslims are instructed to obey: in one hadith, the Prophet says, “[e]ven 
if they beat you and take your wealth, listen and obey.”193 
 Other scholars contend that only a war with an “ultimate religious 
purpose” is permitted.194 Correcting a violation of Islamic law or enforc-
ing that law is one such purpose.195 According to Muslim thinker Ibn 
Khaldun, only jihads and wars against rebels are justified.196 In any case, 
Islamic law of war prohibits unjustified aggression or attacks against 
non-combatants, and emphasizes the protection of innocent people.197 
If a rebellion against a government, sometimes known as baghi, takes 
place between two groups of Muslims, the retreating party may not be 
killed; this does not apply to baghi when only one side is Muslim.198 
III. Analysis 
A. Libya in Revolution 
 As noted earlier, Libya is likely mid-revolution:199 it is currently 
undergoing the aftermath of a violent revolt against the existing legal 
and political order, geared toward the establishment of an entirely new 
order.200 Although the revolution’s success is wavering as the NTC fails 
to effectively consolidate power throughout the country,201 the ensuing 
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political and legal instability in Libya mirrors that of other revolu-
tions.202 
B. Resolution and Reconciliation 
 Despite the historical tradition of violence associated with revolu-
tions, it is clear that a number of international, regional, and religious 
norms are in place to discourage the use of indiscriminate force that 
many Libyan revolutionaries currently employ.203 Given that severe vio-
lations of human rights and international humanitarian law have oc-
curred throughout the Gaddafi regime’s rule and in the wake of the 
revolution, how Libya addresses these crimes is of the utmost impor-
tance.204 
 Commentators have identified several reasons to support the ad-
ministration of “transitional” or “post-conflict justice,” terms used “to 
denote the range of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms aimed at 
dealing with a legacy of large-scale abuses of human rights and/or vio-
lations of international humanitarian law.”205 Transitional justice thus 
“contribute[s] to the restoration and maintenance of peace” in a num-
ber of ways.206 
 Transitional justice promotes stability by establishing a “norm of 
accountability,” thereby deterring repeat offenses.207 Transitional jus-
tice also generates a record of human rights violations, which helps to 
prevent “collective amnesia and . . . the possibility for revisionism.”208 
Though post-conflict justice can take several forms, reparations consti-
tute a concrete improvement in victims’ lives and foster the rule of law 
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204 Rachel Kerr & Eirin Mobekk, Peace & Justice: Seeking Accountability After 
War 3–4 (2007) (highlighting “the need for accountability, . . . justice and to foster recon-
ciliation in societies in transition from authoritarian to democratic rule or from war to 
peace.”); see Whitson, supra note 8 (noting the need for the NTC to address both Gaddafi-
era and revolutionary war crimes). 
205 Kerr & Mobekk, supra note 204, at 3. 
206 Id. at 4. 
207 See id. at 4–5; see also U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 
in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/2011/634 
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by reducing community resentment toward other transitional programs 
such as disarmament and reintegration.209 Transitional justice also bol-
sters stability and the rule of law by creating reliable judicial institutions 
and preventing perpetrators from retaining power.210 For these rea-
sons, the NTC and its eventual permanent successor should utilize 
transitional justice mechanisms in order to contribute to a stable, en-
during peace in the aftermath of Libya’s revolution.211 
                                                                                                                     
 The question remains as to what form of post-conflict justice is best 
suited to Libya.212 The following sections address three broad options 
for Libya: judicial national responsibility,213 judicial international re-
sponsibility,214 and truth commissions.215 The final subsection further 
argues that rather than any one solution in isolation, a contextualized, 
multifaceted approach involving international assistance and emphasiz-
ing the role of national stakeholders would be ideal.216 
1. National Responsibility 
 The ultimate responsibility for prosecuting Gaddafi-era and revo-
lutionary crimes falls with Libya itself.217 The Rome Statute and the UN 
 
209 2011 Secretary-General Report, supra note 207, ¶ 26; U.N. Secretary-General, The 
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& Steven D. Roper eds., 2010) (surveying several different types of transitional justice). 
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cussion infra Part III.B.2. 
215 See Barria & Roper, supra note 209, at 8–9; discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
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pra note 204, at 10; infra text accompanying notes 257–268. 
217 See Rome Statute, supra note 130, pmbl.; Beigbeder, supra note 213, at 2 (indicat-
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Barria & Roper, supra note 209, at 5–6. 
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Security Council strongly encourage states to prosecute war criminals 
themselves and end impunity.218 In November 2011, the NTC an-
nounced plans to investigate and potentially prosecute Gaddafi-era 
crimes, which include rapes, “mass murders, disappearances and public 
executions,” among other offenses.219 
 Interim Justice Minister Mohammad al-Alagi expressed the NTC’s 
intention to “emphasize[] fact-finding and accountability rather than 
punishment.”220 With the hope of employing institutional models like 
those used in Chile and Argentina, and specifically the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the NTC aims “to show the pub-
lic what happened, the reality.”221 Al-Alagi indicated that these eventual 
institutions would pursue fair trials, particularly for higher-level Gad-
dafi-era officials.222 For those not identified as central criminal figures, 
al-Alagi seemed to suggest that a law of forgiveness, or amnesty, may be 
considered.223 In his comments, al-Alagi focused particularly on Gad-
dafi-era officials, and non-governmental organizations such as Human 
Rights Watch have pointed out that there is no evident investigation 
into crimes committed by anti-Gaddafi fighters.224 
 Though it remains to be seen how the reconciliation will progress, 
any attempt by the NTC to follow through on plans to create an investi-
gative committee will face significant obstacles because Libya’s court 
system needs significant reform and militias still retain power in most of 
the country.225 Instead of channeling national reconciliation through a 
carefully-planned and executed truth commission or similar institution, 
Libyans have pursued a similar revolutionary path to Iran, charging and 
trying individuals for arbitrary crimes like “treason against the revolu-
tion.”226 Additionally, the NTC has been incapable of extending control 
over either prisoners—housed in various detention facilities throughout 
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the country—or the militias.227 With multiple challenges to its domi-
nance, it is unclear if the NTC will be able to retain control over Libya in 
a way that would lead to effective national reconciliation.228 
 Libya’s current political and legal challenges exemplify many of the 
shortcomings associated with relying solely on national courts to admin-
ister post-conflict justice.229 Such challenges generate “unrealistic” ex-
pectations for national courts to meet in prosecuting war crimes.230 
Domestic courts are often influenced by concerns of state as well as po-
litical pressures when attempting to judge their own citizens.231 Often, 
justice is limited to the trial of the “losers” by the “winners” in a civil war 
or similar conflict.232 In other instances, the judicial system may cease to 
function independently of an oppressive regime, and is thus incapable 
of administering appropriate transitional justice.233 
 Although national courts in Libya may not currently provide the 
best option for post-conflict reconciliation, the importance of national 
involvement in any reconciliation process is crucial.234 In a 2004 report 
to the UN Security Council, then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan em-
phasized the need for “active and meaningful participation of national 
stakeholders,” including political leaders, legal officials, and “key 
groups” such as displaced persons and women.235 The Secretary-
General also suggested that the UN should leave decision-making to 
these domestic stakeholders and carefully consult atrocity victims in 
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designing any transitional justice mechanism.236 Even if national insti-
tutions are presently inadequate to effectuate post-conflict justice, Lib-
yan stakeholders should play a central role in shaping any reconcilia-
tion model.237 
                                                                                                                     
2. International Responsibility: International Criminal Tribunal or 
Hybrid Criminal Tribunal? 
 As previously discussed, the UN Security Council referred the situ-
ation in Libya to the ICC on February 26, 2011.238 The ICC Prosecutor 
opened cases against top officials of the Gaddafi regime only: the de 
facto Prime Minister, the then-head of military intelligence, and Gaddafi 
himself.239 While the ICC is primarily designed to prosecute leadership 
crimes, it also has jurisdiction to try any grave breach of the Geneva 
Convention.240 The Prosecutor could initiate further investigations of 
the events in Libya, including the apparent summary execution of 
Gaddafi, which the Prosecutor stated may have been a war crime.241 
Given the Rome Statute’s “particularity” requirement, however, it is 
more likely that the Prosecutor will only pursue those “war crimes . . . 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as a part of a large-scale com-
mission of such crimes.”242 
 Reliance on the ICC or ad hoc international criminal tribunals for 
administering post-conflict justice may raise significant issues.243 
Though not subject to identical domestic pressures as state or national 
courts, international tribunals operate under other influences, such as 
international politics.244 International tribunals “are dependent on 
states for their creation, their staffing, their financing and their legal, 
logistical and administrative support,”245 and function at the juncture of 
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law and international politics.246 Such influence was clear in the Nur-
emberg and Tokyo military tribunals, as both “exercised victors’ justice” 
against the respective German and Japanese defendants, but not against 
members of the Allied forces.247 Later tribunals such as the ICTR still 
tend to focus disproportionately on the crimes of the vanquished, rather 
than the victorious.248 
                                                                                                                     
 Another possibility for Libya is to create a hybrid criminal tribunal 
akin to those used in East Timor, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone.249 Be-
cause these tribunals require financing and administration by both na-
tional and international actors, states and the international community 
are less likely to raise objections over sovereignty and financing, respec-
tively.250 These hybrid courts utilize both domestic and international 
judges, laws, and lawyers.251 In theory, hybrid tribunals also help recon-
struct the post-conflict society’s judicial branch: they “provide greater 
educational and training benefits than international tribunals, and also 
offer local ownership of the judicial process while . . . ensuring interna-
tional standards of justice.”252 As a result, hybrid tribunal participants 
can use their experience to establish new, more sound judicial institu-
tions.253 
 In his 2004 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General 
noted that in certain situations, mixed tribunals have been beneficial: 
they “have helped bring justice and hope to victims, combat the impu-
nity of perpetrators and enrich the jurisprudence of international crimi-
nal law.”254 The Secretary-General also noted, however, that both mixed 
tribunals and international criminal tribunals like the ICTY and ICTR 
are costly and have failed to support long-term institutional justice ad-
ministration in post-conflict countries.255 As a result, such tribunals, 
standing alone, will be unlikely to promote sustainable peace in Libya.256 
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3. Truth Commissions or Amnesties and Rule of Law Reform 
 Another option for Libyan post-conflict reconciliation is for the 
NTC to grant amnesty to individuals or groups implicated in Gaddafi-
era and revolutionary crimes.257 Numerous post-conflict governments 
have used amnesties.258 It is unclear, however, whether states can legally 
grant amnesty for crimes against humanity, given the nature of these 
crimes and states’ affirmative responsibility under international law to 
prosecute war criminals.259 Additionally, revolutionary groups can ig-
nore amnesties as they did in Iran, and incoming regimes can grant 
them merely to avoid challenges to their legitimacy.260 
 In light of the challenges inherent in international and mixed tri-
bunals, the Secretary-General emphasized the importance of consider-
ing truth commissions as a legitimate alternative.261 A truth commis-
sion has been defined as: 
                                                                                                                     
an ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centered commission of 
inquiry set up in and authorized by a state for the primary 
purposes of (1) investigating and reporting on the principal 
causes and consequences of broad and relatively recent pat-
terns of severe violence or repression that occurred in the 
state during determinate periods of abusive rule or conflict, 
 
General Report, supra note 209, summary (emphasizing that transitional justice that fo-
cuses on only one institutional mechanism will not be effective), and Hafner & King, supra 
note 236, at 91 (noting that “tribunals alone cannot bear the full burden of doing justice 
and stitching polities back together,” and exploring the potential use of different types of 
transitional justice mechanisms in tandem). 
257 See Barria & Roper, supra note 209, at 8; Nossiter, supra note 22 (noting that the 
NTC is considering an amnesty law). 
258 Barria & Roper, supra note 209, at 8; Emily H. McCarthy, South Africa’s Amnesty Proc-
ess: A Viable Route Toward Truth and Reconciliation?, 3 Mich. J. Race & L. 183, 200–01 (1997) 
(pointing out that amnesties have been used in post-apartheid South Africa, as well as in 
Chile, El Salvador, and Argentina). 
259 Beigbeder, supra note 213, at 2; Barria & Roper, supra note 209, at 8; Ronald C. 
Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General Principles of Anglo-
American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 173, 177 (2002) (“[T]o date 
there is only one amnesty that comes close to qualifying [as just]: the 1995 South African 
amnesty.”). 
260 See Daneshvar, supra note 54, at 135 (highlighting that Iranian revolutionary tri-
bunals ignored an amnesty decree); Barria & Roper, supra note 209, at 8 (pointing out that 
new democratic regimes, “fearful that criminal prosecutions could undermine [their] 
legitimacy,” have employed amnesties to avoid such undermining). 
261 2004 Secretary-General Report, supra note 209, summary. 
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and (2) making recommendations for their redress and fu-
ture prevention.262 
 Unlike tribunals, truth commissions have none of the trappings of 
a court: their crucial functions include finding and reporting facts, as-
sessing origins of the conflict, and “dignify[ing] victims through victim-
centered public hearings;” they cannot impose penalties on individu-
als.263 In a truth commission’s final report, however, it can recommend 
future action, “including the prosecution of individuals, judicial reform, 
and changes within the military and law enforcement.”264 
 A truth commission and its resultant recommendations closely 
match the NTC’s ideas for post-revolution reconciliation, and provide 
an opportunity to eventually hold both pro-Gaddafi and revolutionary 
fighters accountable for their actions.265 According to the Secretary-
General, the search for appropriate transitional justice mechanisms, 
like those required in Libya today, must look beyond international or 
hybrid tribunals.266 Truth commissions, complemented by later tribu-
nals and accompanying rule of law reforms,267 provide more promise 
than international or hybrid tribunals alone, which would be “distant 
from the citizenry” and the goals of establishing a long-term, healthy 
judicial system.268 
Conclusion 
 Libya erupted in conflict in early 2011, culminating with the over-
throw and eventual death of Muammar Gaddafi. Yet that conflict is on-
                                                                                                                      
262 Mark Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness 18 (2006). 
263 Id. at 71–72. 
264 Barria & Roper, supra note 209, at 9. 
265 See 2004 Secretary-General Report, supra note 209, ¶¶ 23–27 (emphasizing the 
need of consulting with national stakeholders in shaping any transitional justice mecha-
nism); Kerr & Mobekk, supra note 204, at 10 (repudiating “a one-size-fits-all approach to 
transitional justice” and noting the importance of considering national context); Barria & 
Roper, supra note 209, at 9; Nossiter, supra note 22 (indicating the NTC’s intention to 
model post-conflict justice mechanisms after institutions such as South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission). 
266 Compare 2011 Secretary-General Report, supra note 207, ¶ 5 (highlighting chal-
lenges to building the rule of law in Libya), with 2004 Secretary-General Report, supra note 
209, ¶¶ 25–26 (stressing the importance of focusing exclusively on international or mixed 
tribunals as a transitional justice mechanism), and Whitson, supra note 8 (emphasizing 
Libya’s need to come to terms with both Gaddafi-era and revolutionary crimes). 
267 Barria & Roper, supra note 209, at 9. 
268 See 2004 Secretary-General Report, supra note 209, summary, ¶¶ 25–26; Barria & 
Roper, supra note 209, at 7–8; Hafner & King, supra note 236, at 104 (“Tribunals are too 
remote from the people to accomplish all that has been expected of them.”). 
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going at the time of this writing, as militias illegally detain suspected 
Gaddafi supporters, and torture, rape, forcibly displace, and execute 
non-combatants. Assuming for the purposes of this Note that the Lib-
yan conflict is a revolution, the turbulence in Libya can be located with-
in an established tradition of revolutionary violence. Scholars have ac-
cepted violence as an as inevitable facet of revolution, but few have 
addressed the idea that individuals engaging in anomic revolutionary 
behavior should be held accountable for their crimes. 
 Multitudes of laws and influences operate on actors in the Libyan 
context, from international humanitarian law to Islamic law, and de-
spite the abrogation of the Gaddafi-era legal order, law still governs 
these actors. Because Libyan revolutionaries are not outside the law, it 
is imperative to creating a sustainable peace in Libya that these actors— 
whether pro- or anti-Gaddafi, pro- or counter-revolution—be held ac-
countable for their actions. 
 Among the options for holding these actors accountable, a multi-
faceted approach would be best to ensure peace in post-conflict Libya. 
An initial step in doing so would be creating a mandate for a truth 
commission, whose recommendations would eventually lead to individ-
ual prosecutions and to simultaneous strengthening of the rule of law 
in the country. 
